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Introduction 
Globalization provides new potential for the scope and reach of 
reproductive service markets through the expansion of cross-border 
surrogacy and egg markets. As the technology advances in both contexts, 
gestational surrogacy and egg markets, new cases are emerging in the 
media and the courts, exposing questionable business practices, and 
raising obvious needs for regulation. Surprisingly, while there are many 
calls for global regulation of cross-border surrogacy markets, the parallel 
call to regulate egg markets is not as prevalent, reflecting a difference  
†  Princeton University, Center for Human Values and Woodrow Wilson 
School’s Office of Population Research. 
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in how egg retrieval and surrogacy are viewed. This article probes the 
question of why the surrogacy market garners so much more attention 
than the egg market. It specifically considers whether there is a reason 
to differentiate the egg and surrogacy markets, or whether they are 
similar in terms of motives for regulation. 
The article offers two levels of analysis. First, whether to legitimize 
either one of the markets. Second, if allowed, or at least not forbidden, 
how to regulate market failures. Within each one of these analyses, the 
article asks whether the answer should be different when applied to the 
egg and surrogacy markets. Part I shows that many of the rationales, 
either to allow or to forbid each market, apply to both the egg and 
surrogacy contexts similarly. However, the paper claims that there is 
no justification to completely prohibit either market. Given that some 
sort of commodification will have to be acknowledged, Part II reviews 
the conduct of both cross-border markets and the main failures that 
raise the need for regulation in each market. The paper emphasizes that 
for both egg and surrogacy markets similar market failures are relevant, 
raising the need for regulation. In light of the international calling for 
regulation of cross-border surrogacy markets, Part III explains why 
initiatives focus more on surrogacy rather than on the egg market. It 
asks why only the surrogacy market has taken the initiative to regulate 
the market, although in both egg and surrogacy markets the protection 
of “assisting women”1 should be one of the motives for regulation. Since 
motives for regulation are similar in both markets, it concludes that the 
protection of assisting women is not the main motive fueling such 
regulation. Part IV considers two possible regulative approaches: a 
minimalistic and a pro-active approach. The article applies both to the 
two markets. The paper supports a pro-active legal approach not only 
because it gives the same protections as the minimalistic approach, 
which provides for safety and basic human rights safeguards, but also 
because it addresses the social structure and class differentiation when 
it aims to ameliorate women’s expectation for recognition. Nevertheless, 
either of these approaches requires the adoption of a single regulative 
framework for both egg and surrogacy markets. 
I. Are There Different Reasons to Allow or Forbid 
Egg and Surrogacy Markets? 
There is a debate whether to allow markets in egg or surrogacy 
services or try to abolish them (if commodities in these markets should 
not be for sale). The sale of body parts and reproductive capacities are 
 
1. By “assisting women” I refer to women assisting in the reproduction of others: 
egg providers and surrogates who offer their services in the market for 
reproductive services (sperm providers can be considered, comparatively as, 
assisting men). Egg providers are egg sellers. 
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the subject of lively discourse. Critics claim that market norms fail to 
properly value some goods whose distributive criterion belongs to a 
unique sphere of valuation, or that we should take out of the market 
entities for which money is not a good distributive criterion.2 This line 
of argument, which I call “the intrinsic-value based argument”, 
criticizes any form of commercialized reproductive services, and seeks 
to abolish them entirely by, for example, criminalizing the commercial 
provision of these practices.3 An intrinsic value-based argument implies 
that commercializing reproductive services may contradict the public 
good, or pose other moral hazards requiring a regulation to abolish the 
practice. Both egg and surrogacy markets may jeopardize such moral 
standards by posing a threat to dignity. Exploring the general discourse 
about commodification of reproductive services is beyond the scope of 
this article. Instead, this section focuses on three arguments often used 
in order to require a regulation that abolishes either market: the intent 
to create future life; physical implications on the female body; and 
selling an inalienable commodity. The main question is whether the 
differences between egg and surrogacy services imply that, based on 
these arguments, one could be commodified while the other should not. 
a. Commodification of Future/Potential Life 
Both egg retrieval and surrogacy deal with the commodification of 
what is, at the time of transacting, “future life.” The payment in 
exchange of undergoing a procedure or providing a service that results in 
a life of a person is often seen as wrong and degrading.4 Commentators 
often mention that the payment is given in exchange for the discomfort 
and exposure to medical risk for egg retrieval or pregnancy, and not for 
the life of a future human being.5 This is probably due to the intent to 
 
2. See Michael Sandel, Address at the Oxford Tanner Lecture Series on 
Human Values entitled “What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets”, 72 (May 11, 1998-May 12, 1998); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES 
OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Thomas H. 
Murray, New Reproductive Technologies and the Family, in NEW WAYS 
OF MAKING BABIES : THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 51, 63 (Cynthia B. 
Cohen ed., 1996); Allen Verhey, Commodification, Commercialization, 
and Embodiment, 7 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 132, 132-33 (1997). 
3. E.g., NORRIS, S., TIEDEMANN, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, NO. 2011-82-E, 
LEGAL STATUS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL OF ASSISTED HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION IN CANADA, 7 (Sept. 6, 2011), available at: http://www.
parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-82-e.pdf 
4. Glenn I. Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, The Value of Nothing: 
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 710 (2003); 
Dov Fox, Paying for Particulars in People-to-be: Commercialization, 
Commodification and Commensurability in Human Reproduction, 34 J. MED. 
ETHICS 162, 164 (2008). 
5. For egg donation, see David B Resnik, Regulating the Market for Human 
Eggs, 15 BIOETHICS 1, 3 (2001); for surrogacy, see Katherine B. Lieber, 
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avoid the concept of market in future life. Analogously, fewer potential 
medical risks and discomfort in sperm markets, which also transact 
“future life” but hardly bear risks, may explain why those are 
acceptable and do not raise the same sort of objection.6 
Just as the avoidance to conceptualize the commodification of 
future life applies to both services, so do the critiques. It is doubtful 
that payment is given in exchange for discomfort or exposure to risk.7 
If payment in the egg market was given to compensate for discomfort 
or risk—given that all egg providers and all surrogates go through the 
same procedure and are exposed to the same potential discomfort and 
risks—standard procedures should have had one tariff. Albeit, a 
different tariff for surrogacy services and egg recruitment. Procedures 
carried out in places that expose women to higher risks, for example in 
countries or clinics with less advanced facilities or procedure that end 
in infections or complications, should have provided assisting women 
with an additional fee because of the extent of the physical risk that 
they are exposed to. 
Conceptualizing the payment as payment for discomfort may hide 
the inconvenient perception of paying for future life, but the market 
does not avoid the pitfalls the conceptualization aims to bypass. 
Effectively, some egg sellers are paid much more than others, not 
because of additional discomfort, but rather because their eggs embody 
greater potential for obtaining children with certain traits: height, eye 
color, athletic abilities, academic degree, etc..8 The more socially 
desirable the traits, the higher the demand and the price paid “for the 
procedure,” or maybe for the value of future life that the eggs bear. 
In surrogacy, “future life” is embodied not necessarily in the price, 
but rather in the payment conditions that attach the service to the 
bottom line of a “take home baby.”9 In the current payment practice, 
at least part of this money is paid only with the successful delivery of  
Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be 
Answered, 68 IND. L. J. 205, 231 (1992). 
6. See Paul Solman, Sex Cells: The Gender Divided Market for Eggs and 
Sperm, NEWSHOUR (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.pbs.org/newshour
/economy/sex-cells-the-gender-divided-market-for-eggs-and-sperm. 
7. Id. 
8. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market-A New and 
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1, 13 n.41 (2003) 
(reporting price differences $750-3500 vs. $25,000-$50,000 for elite college 
providers, athlete, blonde, etc.); Fox, supra note 4, at 165; Suzanne 
Holland, Contested Commodities at Both Ends of Life: Buying and Selling 
Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissue, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263, 272 
(2001). 
9. Isha Bhatia, Indian Surrogacy Industry Sets Take-home-baby Trend, DW 
(June 2, 2013), http://www.dw.com/en/indian-surrogacy-industry-sets-
take-home-baby-trend/a-16579078. 
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a “take home baby,” regardless of discomfort.10 Surrogates are paid in 
several payments after conception, but if they cannot conceive, they 
often will not be paid at all, or get paid only very small amounts.11 
When pregnancy is achieved, surrogacy contracts often state that the 
surrogate will not receive any compensation if she miscarries before a 
certain point. If she miscarries after that established point, or if the 
baby is stillborn, she will receive only a small amount of compensation.12 
The success rate for living birth for three cycles of In Vitro Fertilization 
(IVF) treatment is 45 percent, and slightly higher for pregnancy and 
live births per successive cycle.13 It means that even if a surrogate 
woman goes through three cycles of IVF, there is approximately a 55 
percent chance she will not end up birthing a living baby. Despite 
substantial physical and emotional discomfort, most cycles do not 
successfully produce a child, so the surrogate will not be paid the full 
amount. The surrogacy market does not only commodify the risks and 
discomfort of the medical procedure itself. Rather, they commodify the 
creation of future life. 
If future life is commodified, the difference between egg and surrogacy 
transactions may play a role. The success rate of egg retrieval are more 
likely to advance the commodification of future life. Success rates for 
retrieving eggs are 71.1 percent for the majority cycles of egg retrieval,14 
in comparison to only 45 percent for a successful live birth per three 
cycles of IVF.15 However, each technology is placed on a different stage 
to achieve a child: egg donation transactions conclude with a transfer 
of eggs, which is not even an embryo and is therefore more remote from 
a “future life.” Surrogacy transactions involve an embryo, a fetus, and 
eventually creates a “take home baby.”16 However, this should not 
necessarily make a difference in regulation. Often, in the discussion 
 
10. Sheela Saravanan, An Ethno-methodological Approach to Examine 
Exploitation in the Context of Capacity, Trust and Experience of 
Commercial Surrogacy in India, 8 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 1, 10 
(2013). 
11. See Angie Godwin McEwen, So You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: 
Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 277 n. 35 (1999), Saravanan, supra note 10, at 10. 
12. Janna C. Merrick, The Case of Baby M, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
BIOMEDICINE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 184,185 (1990). 
13. Beth A. Malizia et al., Cumulative Live-Birth Rates After In Vitro 
Fertilization, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 236, 239, 241 (2009). 
14. John David Gordon, et al., Utilization and Success Rates of Unstimulated 
In Vitro Fertilization in the United States: An Analysis of the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Database, 100 FERTIL. STERIL. 392, 394 
(2013). 
15. Malizia et al., supra, note 13, at 239. 
16. Resnik, supra note 5, at 8. 
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about egg markets, it seems that the desired result is the eggs 
themselves. Yet, though eggs do not immediately become a living 
human being on their own, no buyer’s purpose is to own a functional 
organ as she would own a kidney for its bodily function. The purpose 
of the transaction is to create independent life.17 Many patients will 
keep buying eggs until they result in an embryo, then a child. The 
different stage in the process of creating future life seems therefore a 
technical, rather than a substantial difference. 
If it is illegitimate to commodify the creation of future life in the 
market, then markets for both technologies qualify for similar banning 
regulation. Regulators should acknowledge, though, that abolishing 
these services on the basis of the creation of future life should apply to 
other markets that trade “life-giving” factors, such as sperm. Moreover, 
maybe even organ markets should be abolished on the same basis, since 
organs such as kidneys grant life to persons with poor prospects to live.18 
b. Harmful Medical Procedures 
In the markets of both egg and surrogacy procedures, women give 
away certain control over their body and submit it to invasive medical 
procedures. Those procedures expose them to physical risks and require 
professional medical supervision and control.19 Major differences in the 
type of hardship and gravity of the physical risks between egg retrieval 
and surrogacy services might imply that one market should be 
abolished, while the other considered acceptable. 
 
17. See Karlsen, J. R., P. L. de Faria, & J. H. Solbakk, To Know The Value 
Of Everything—A Critical Commentary On B Björkman And So 
Hansson’s “Bodily Rights And Property Rights, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 215, 
218 (2006) (suggesting to focus on different “biological materials, its 
actual economic potential and the practice needed to bring about a fair 
remuneration” instead on bodily property rights according to market 
approaches). 
18. I do not mean to undermine the difference, but it could also be used either 
way. While no alternative procedures exist to recruit eggs, the need for a 
gamete might not be as justified as the need for organs for transplantation. 
Life-saving is an emergency act that justifies the use of extreme measures, 
donation for reproductive purposes is not as essential to the body’s 
function. See Amy Friedman, Payment for Living Organ Donation Should 
be Legalized, 333 BMJ 746, 747 (2006). 
19. For surrogacy, see John Tobin, To Prohibit Or Permit: What Is The 
(Human) Rights Response To The Practice Of International Commercial 
Surrogacy?, 63 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 317, 347 (2014). For egg providers, 
see Michal Nahman, Reverse Traffic: Intersecting Inequalities in Human 
Egg Donation, 23 Reprod. Biomed. Online 626, 631 (2011). 
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Egg providers must agree to take hormones for about ten days and 
go through a single, invasive medical procedure.20 First, an egg provider 
must undergo hormone stimulation to increase the number of eggs that 
can be harvested.21 Hormone treatment may cause side effects, such as 
heat waves, nausea, and headaches.22 Some women suffer hyper 
stimulation syndrome, a potentially life-threatening reaction.23 The 
process is also believed to expose women to a higher risk of contracting 
cancer later in life.24 Second, the egg provider undergoes trans-vaginal 
ultrasound aspiration, a surgical procedure in which the doctor removes 
the mature eggs from the woman’s body while she is under conscious 
sedation.25 Since “harvesting” eggs must occur at a certain time, the 
egg provider must also agree to be called to the clinic for an ultrasound 
imaging that shows whether the provider’s eggs have sufficiently 
developed. The entire procedure from hormone stimulation to retrieval 
takes a couple of weeks.26 
Surrogacy involves a longer-term contract, requiring a woman to 
undergo nine months of monitored pregnancy to safeguard the wellbeing 
of the fetus and the surrogate.27 Monitoring includes repeated medical 
examinations, ending in labor that has its own set of difficulties and risks. 
Pregnancy-related medical problems include, for example, anemia, ectopic 
pregnancy, gestational diabetes, high blood pressure, severe and persistent 
nausea and vomiting during pregnancy, vaginal bleeding, infections, 
preterm labor, miscarriage, depression, and complications that can 
 
20. See How Egg Donation Works, CNTR. FOR HUMAN REPRODUCTION, 
https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/egg-donation/how-it-works/ 
(last updated Jan. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Center for Human Reproduction]. 
21. Id. 
22. Donor Egg Risks & Complications, EGG DONOR AM., https://www.eggd
onoramerica.com/become-egg-donor/donor-egg-risks-complications (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
23. Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, ScienceDirect, https://www.science
direct.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/ovarian-hyperstimulation-
syndrome (last visited March 14, 2018). 
24. Robert G. Brzyski, Putting Risk in Perspective, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 
25 (2001). 
25. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, EGG DONOR INFORMATION 
PROJECT, http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/
procedures.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
26. See Center for Human Reproduction, supra note 20. 
27. Julie Bindel, Outstanding Pregnancy: a Visit to India’s Surrogacy Clinics, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/apr/01/outsourcing-pregnancy-india-surrogacy-
clinics-julie-bindel. 
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occur during childbirth.28 In addition to continuous medical supervision, 
for several months the process subjects women to major behavioral 
constraints. During the pregnancy, surrogates should neither smoke or 
drink alcohol, nor in any way endanger the pregnancy.29 
The nature and duration of egg retrieval risks and restrictions are 
very different from those of providing surrogacy services. Regulators 
may look at the risks as acceptable for one technology and not for the 
other, requiring regulation that abolishes one and permits the other. 
However, the difference between egg retrieval and surrogacy procedures 
seems less relevant to the argument for abolishing the market than the 
difference between commercialized and non-commercialized practices, 
which entail the same risks. Hence, if risks alone justified a complete 
ban on a given procedure, they would justify a complete ban on both 
commercialized and non-commercialized practices. Since it is often 
acceptable for women to undergo non-commercialized surrogacy and 
egg donation, the harms associated with these medical procedures are 
insufficient to justify a complete ban on either egg or surrogacy markets. 
However, any permissive regulation should address the particular risks and 
characteristics, as discussed below in section II (a). 
c. The Inalienability Involved in Reproductive Commodities 
Another aspect of the use of the female body, which may justify 
abolishing regulation for either one of the markets, connects the use of 
human body parts with dignity. Scholars claim that putting a price on 
a woman’s body will then allow for the price of a human being. Since 
“everything has either a price or a dignity”,hing with a market somet 30 
 
28. For risks in surrogacy, see Amrita Pande, Not an ‘Angel’, Not a ‘Whore’ 
- Surrogates as ‘Dirty’ Workers in India, 16 INDIAN J. GENDER STUD. 141, 
147 (2009) [hereinafter Pande 2009]; Pregnancy, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant/pregnancy-
complications.html#b (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
29. See Surrogates, SURROGATE.COM, https://surrogate.com/surrogates
/pregnancy-and-health/surrogate-health-requirements/ (last visited Jan. 
20, 2018). 
30. IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC 
OF MORALS 42-43 (1998) (“In the kingdom of ends, everything has either 
a price or a dignity.”). For surrogates, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is 
Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 80 (1990) 
(arguing that denying gestational ties to children, as commercial 
surrogacy does, is to deny the significance of reproductive labor to the 
mother who undergoes it and thereby to dehumanize and degrade the 
mother herself). For egg providers, see Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and 
Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: the Gift of the Magi Revised, 24 J. 
MED. PHIL. 288, 299 (1999) (arguing that the commodification of human 
eggs threatens the value we place on human dignity because human eggs 
(and other parts or products) have derivative dignity.) [hereinafter 
Cohen]. 
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value cannot have dignity. Specifically, some scholars argue that the 
female body, sexuality, and reproduction are more integral to her 
identity than other productive capacities, and therefore inalienable to a 
woman’s personhood.31 The major concern is the same for both 
technologies: that women will be perceived as “an abstract, fungible 
unit with no individuating characteristics,”32 possessing several 
alienable “objects.” That is, women will be seen merely as an incubator 
or an egg machine rather than a person, and thus the commodification 
would harm their worth as unique and valuable persons.33 This 
subsection focuses on whether the inalienability involved in either 
surrogacy or egg markets should lead to creating a regulation that 
abolishes one market but allows the other. 
Two relevant counter-arguments may lead to different conclusions 
regarding the right approach towards potentially inalienable 
commodities. First, not all transactions that use the body have the same 
inherent value. For example, one technology may have more inherent 
value—and thus should be abolished—while the other could somehow 
be commodified. One may argue that there is a difference between the 
sale of egg and surrogacy services in the item being commodified, and, 
therefore, the inherent value that each technology bears is different. In 
egg transactions, the commodification aspect is very similar to selling a 
human organ or tissue in surplus because a human organ is detached 
from the woman’s body until it becomes the property of the person who 
bought it. The surrogate, on the other hand, does not lose any part of 
her body. She carries the child, which is made of genetic material that 
does not belong to her, and gives the child away at birth. She does not 
sell, but rather commodifies her uterus, which she “rents” or uses to 
provide “carrying services.” Thus, egg sales and surrogacy services are 
slightly different. In egg donation, the commodification focuses on the 
sale of human body parts or tissue, whereas in surrogacy, it addresses 
a rental of a human organ, the uterus. 
If only one of the two practices alienates aspects of a woman’s 
personhood in such a way that complete abolition is justified, which 
practice is it—egg selling or womb rental? Eggs are not renewable like 
blood or hair—organs that are acceptably exchanged for money. 
 
31. Margaret.J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1906 
(1987); For egg providers, see Cohen, supra note 30, at 296; for surrogacy, 
see e.g.., Anderson, supra note 30, at 80-84. 
32. Sarah B. Angel, Note, The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis of Risk 
and Reward in Stem Cell Research, 22 BERKELEY J. OF GENDER, LAW & 
JUSTICE 183, 214 (2007). 
33. See generally, Radin, supra note 3, at 1885. For egg providers, see Resnik, 
supra note 5, at 20; for surrogates, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and 
the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 131 
(2009). 
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Rather, a woman is born with approximately one million eggs, and 
during her reproductive time life only 300 to 400 will be ovulated.34 In 
contrast to kidney harvesting, the size of a woman’s egg pool is not 
significantly impacted by donation, which makes it easier to trade in 
eggs as compared to other essential organs. A surrogate “rents” her 
body for a longer period during which she is impacted physically and 
emotionally. 35 A surrogate is requested to provide “motherly” care 
during the pregnancy (in this aspect their work is more similar to care 
work). She can grow attached to the fetus, and this may add to her 
emotional burden and to the inalienability of the service she provides.36 
She should control her emotions immediately after the transaction is 
completed, and refrain from forming a relationship with the child that 
she birthed.37 Egg recruitment requires a lower level of intimacy than 
surrogacy, since it consists in a technical procedure conducted under 
anesthesia in which no emotional burden is imposed on the woman in 
question. To that degree, egg recruitment is less alienating to a woman’s 
personhood than surrogacy. The different physical and emotional 
burdens may be a reason to prohibit surrogacy markets all together, 
unlike the egg market, or it may require at least a different regulative 
model for each market. 
This conclusion, although relevant, might be reverse when 
analyzing the genetic connection to the future child. If the inherent 
value of the procedure relies on the genetic characteristics that are 
inalienable to the provider’s personhood, then regulators may need to 
prohibit egg markets. In egg transactions, 50 percent of the genetic 
material reflected in the genetics of the resulting child belongs to the 
egg provider. This could imply that the future child bears the genetic 
characteristics inalienable to the egg provider’s personhood, which are 
being sold. If genetic connection bears a greater inherent value than 
gestational connection, it may be a reason to prohibit the egg market 
but to allow surrogacy markets. However, studies show that gestational  
34. Female Reproductive System, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelan
dclinic.org/health/articles/9118-female-reproductive-system (last updated 
May 14, 2012). 
35. For physical and emotional risks, see infra Part II.a 
36. On the exchange of emotions according to the norms of market exchange, 
see Anderson, supra note 30, at 84; Nancy Folbre & Julia A. Nelson, For 
Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 123, 129 (2000). See 
also CTR. FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD – ETHICAL OR 
COMMERCIAL 30 (2012), available at http://www.womenleadership.in
/Csr/SurrogacyReport.pdf [hereinafter SOCIAL RESEARCH] (reporting a 
field level observation that notes that surrogate mothers would usually 
feel attached to the babies). 
37. Todd D. Pizitz et al., Do Women Who Choose to Become Surrogate 
Mothers have Different Psychological Profiles Compared to a Normative 
Female Sample?, 26 WOMEN & BIRTH, e15, 15 (2012). 
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connection is highly valuable as well.38 Maternal stress39 and 
“adversity”40 might induce long-lasting effects on offspring outcomes 
morphology, physiology and behaviors in later life. These traits are also 
inalienable to the women, making the epigenetic connection a reason to 
prohibit surrogacy markets. Society may decide that one type of 
connection is stronger than the other. Thus, one market injures 
inalienable aspects of a woman—and should be abolished, while the 
other is alienable—and acceptable. However, there are plausible arguments 
for the conclusion that both technologies implicate comparably inalienable 
aspects of personhood. These arguments suggest that a similar regulatory 
approach is justified in both cases. 
The second counter-argument claims that inalienability is 
insufficient to justify abolition of one practice but not the other. First, 
it is debatable whether one practice is alienable while the other is not. 
Social conventions regarding the inherent value in eggs or the uterus 
are incoherent and open to many definitions, according to personal and 
cultural symbols.41 But even if both technologies commodify something 
integral to a person’s identity, there may not be anything debasing 
about it or harmful to the extent that it requires an abolishing 
regulation.42 While some women may find commodifying certain bodily 
 
38. See Intended Parents, SURROGACY.COM, https://surrogate.com/intended-
parents/raising-a-child-born-from-surrogacy/how-to-emotionally-
transfer-a-baby-born-via-surrogacy/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018);see also 
Patty Onderko, The New Science of Mother-Baby Bonding, PARENTING, 
http://www.parenting.com/article/the-new-science-of-mother-baby-
bonding (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
39. Lei Cao-Lei et al., Prenatal Maternal Stress and Epigenetics: Review of 
the Human Research, 2 CURRENT MOLECULAR BIOLOGY REP. 16, 17 
(2016). 
40. Catherine Monk, Julie Spicer & Frances A. Champagne, Linking Prenatal 
Maternal Adversity to Developmental Outcomes in Infants: The Role of 
Epigenetic Pathways, 24 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1361, 1361-62 (2012). 
41. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF MARKETS 119-20 (2010) [hereinafter Satz 2010]; Anita L. Allen, 
Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARVARDHARV. J. L & 
PUB. POL’Y. 139, 146 (1991); see Heather Widdows, Border Disputes 
Across Bodies: Exploitation in Trafficking for Prostitution and Egg Sale 
for Stem Cell Research, 2 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 5, 
18 (2009) (“dignity might be subjectively perceived, for example, a woman 
who sees no affront to her dignity in prostitution”); Martha Nussbaum, 
“Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 716 (1998); 
42. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 716. See, e.g., Debra Satz, Markets in 
Women’s Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 115 (1992) 
citing to CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 207 (1988) 
[hereinafter Satz 1992] (“I think that my teaching talents should be 
respected, but I don’t object to being paid for teaching on such grounds. 
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procedures degrading to their bodies, humanity, family, or reproduction, 
other women might find it empowering and valuable. Prohibitive 
regulations based solely on this argument may express the view of 
conservative legal moralism about technologies and an invasion of 
privacy.43 
In light of these disagreements, international consensus on 
abolishing regulation of either one of the markets is hard to find.44 
Eventually, determining what values a state should support and 
deciding whether to allow or prohibit each market is a political 
endeavor. Different moral approaches are expressed in a legislative 
disharmony. Many affluent countries restrict the commercial provision 
of these technologies, so their citizens embrace less-restrictive regimes, 
usually in lower-income countries, to purchase egg and womb services.45 
This reality adds a practical enforcement challenge to any regulation 
that will try to abolish either one of the markets, especially when the 
markets are legal where transactions are conducted. In recent years, 
more lower-middle income countries are closing their gates to foreigners 
who seek reproductive services.46 Yet, the market adapts quickly to 
banning legislation and the hub destinations for cross-border surrogacy 
transactions keep moving from places that closed their gates to new 
destinations where such a practice is not banned yet. For example, 
India’s ban of surrogacy provision to foreigners47 caused the transportation 
of Indian surrogates to Nepal and Thailand, where surrogates are further 
excluded from their communities and no governmental monitoring 
 
Giving my teaching a price does not diminish the other ways in which my 
teaching has value.”). 
43. Allen, supra note 41, at 144, 146; Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, 
A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting 
Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory, 84 KY. L. 
J. 1197, 1214 (1995). 
44. See As demand for surrogacy soars, more countries are trying to ban it, 
THE ECONOMIST (May 13, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/
international/21721926-many-feminists-and-religious-leaders-regard-it-
exploitation-demand-surrogacy [hereinafter The Economist]. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Shashank Bengali, India Scales Back ‘Rent-A-Womb’ Services, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-india-
surrogacy-20160125-story.html. 
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exists.48 When these places banned cross-border surrogacy markets,49 
Cambodia became a new destination for Indian surrogates.50 In 
addition, Georgia opened an independent cross-border market.51 
Similarly, where a state does not allow egg donation, egg sellers are 
flown to countries with permissive legislation and brokers bypass the 
restrictive regulation.52 Another reaction to abolishing both markets is 
the rise of black markets.53 
The complex reality seems to require an international monitoring-
regulation that acknowledges some transactions in both egg and 
surrogacy markets. Should this regulation be different for each market 
or can both markets be regulated under one model of regulation? To 
answer this question, the next section reviews market failures that any 
regulative model should address, based on evidence from studies on 
both egg and surrogacy cross-border markets. 
II. Market Failures: are the Reasons to Regulate the 
Cross-border Egg and Surrogacy Markets Different? 
Given that some sort of commodification should probably be 
acknowledged, this section reviews several market failures to find out 
whether the motives for the regulation rising from egg or surrogacy 
 
48. Julie Bindel, Outsourcing Pregnancy: A Visit to India’s Surrogacy Clinics, 
THE GUARDIAN (April 1, 2016); Abby Rabinowitz, The Trouble with 
Renting a Womb, THE GUARDIAN (April 28, 2016), https://www.th
eguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/28/paying-for-baby-trouble-with-
renting-womb-india. 
49. Bengali, supra note 47; Thailand Bans Commercial Surrogacy For 
Foreigners, BBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-31546717. 
50. Nilanjana Bhowmick, After Nepal, Indian surrogacy clinics move to 
Cambodia, ALJAZEERA (June 28 2016), http://www.aljazeera
.com/indepth/features/2016/06/nepal-indian-surrogacy-clinics-move-
cambodia-160614112517994.html. 
51. See Step by Step Surrogacy in Georgia, ATLAS CARE SURROGACY 
GEORGIA, https://www.caresurrogacygeorgia.com/step-by-step-process 
(last visited October 29, 2017). 
52. See Marika Dobbin, IVF Treatment: South African Agency Flies Egg 
Donors to Australia, THE SYDNEY MORNING HAROLD (Feb. 8 2016), 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/ivf-treatment-south-african-agency-
flies-egg-donors-to-australia-20160208-gmo8qn.html; see Scott Carney, 
Unpacking the Global Human Egg Trade, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 1, 2010), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/1676895/unpacking-global-human-egg-
trade. 
53. Ruth Macklin, What Is Wrong with Commodification, in NEW WAYS OF 
MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 106, 119 (Cynthia B. Cohen 
ed., 1996); Resnik, supra note 5, at 21; KATARINA TRIMMINGS & PAUL 
BEAUMONT, INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 439, 442 (2013). 
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markets are similar, or if the market failures are different in each market 
and require different models of regulation. 
The market system has its own values and is supported by strong 
arguments.54 First, the market helps the development and exercise of 
our capacities as autonomous individual decision-makers. The market 
is an instrument that maximizes liberty and freedoms: the freedom to 
transact, negotiate terms, and make a personal judgment about what 
to buy or sell, all of which nurture conditions for self-esteem.55 Second, 
the market efficiently “constructs social coordination among 
independent individuals with diverse values and preferences through 
contracts.”56 In such economic transactions all parties can benefit from 
the market and therefore possess a mutual interest in the transaction.57 
According to the neo-liberal principle of state neutrality, in a modern 
economy any state policy decision, whether restrictive or permissive, 
interfering with choices made by adults who freely consented to a 
transaction, is considered objectionable. Meaning, according the neo-
liberal principle of state neutrality, state interference is unjustifiable 
unless the market results in market failures that need to be corrected.58 
Known market failures are externalities that occur when one 
benefits without anyone taking responsibility for financing the benefit 
or without paying for minimizing damages that follow.59 Externalities 
are almost inherent in the context of cross-border markets where no 
international regulations exist. Inside a consumer states’ territory, the 
provision of reproductive services is—directly or indirectly—subject to 
state regulation, either through health policy or, if such services can be 
 
54. For the advantages of the market, see Satz 1992, supra note 41, at 111. 
55. On markets and freedoms, see id.at 21; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM 26(1999); WALZER, supra note 2, at 104-05 (“Market 
morality . . . is the celebration of wanting, making, owning and 
exchanging of commodities.”). 
56. Sharon Bassan, Context Matters! Why Terms of Transaction as Well as 
Autonomy Should be Analyzed in the Context of Low-Income Countries, 
14 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 48 (2014). 
57. Id. 
58. RICHARD ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 331 (1974), 
Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 132, 135 (1992); Callahan & Roberts, supra note 43, at 
1214. See also VIRGINIA HELD, THE ETHICS OF CARE – PERSONAL, 
POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL 107, 112 (2006); Richard H. Thaler, & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175, 177 
(2003) (defining “‘paternalistic’ any policy that is selected with the goal 
of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will make those 
parties better off”). 
59. On externalities in healthcare insurance, see COLLEEN FLOOD, INTERNATIONAL 
HEALTH CARE REFORM: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 16 
(2002). 
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traded in the market, through contract law, which subjects the market’s 
participants to certain duties of justice. States should regulate the terms 
of provision for reproductive services and establish proper medical 
standards. If reproductive services are nationally provided, states should 
secure a fair distribution of access to those services. Alternatively, if 
reproductive services are primarily distributed through the market, 
either privately or via insurance coverage, then states should regulate 
that market so as to ensure that no woman suffers exploitation or 
infringement of her rights. Additionally, doctors owe their patients a 
duty to give medical treatment that comports with the minimum 
standard of care. When doctors breach this duty and patients are 
harmed, patients can sue doctors for malpractice or other civil liability 
in state court to recover damages.60 
However, in era of globalization, the ease of mobility, professional 
training, and information and service availability has facilitated 
citizens’ private access to safe extraterritorial reproductive markets. 
Neither consumers’ nor women’s states, nor their institutions are a 
party to these private contracts in the free market.61 In other countries, 
consumers’ states do not determine the rules governing transactions. 
No binding legal norm obligates consumers’ countries to either promote 
the fairness of their citizens’ private transactions or to prevent the 
exploitation of assisting women who are citizens of other countries. To 
that degree, consumers’ states are not legally obligated to secure the 
justice of these transactions as they probably would be with respect to 
transactions that occur exclusively between domestic parties.62 
Transactions are conducted according to the laws in the destination 
countries where they are carried out and are monitored differently in 
each state. Consumers may sue for malpractice, but it might be difficult 
for them to prevail on their malpractice claim in foreign countries 
because the specifics of malpractice laws are often not readily available 
to them.63 Different legal systems, language barriers, cultural 
 
60. M.S. Pandit & Shobha Pandit, Medical Negligence: Coverage of the 
Profession, Duties, Case Law, and Enlightened Defense: A Legal 
Perspective, 25 INDIAN J. UROLOGY 372, 372 (2009); see also Danielle A. 
Vera, R-Egg-Ulation: A Call for Greater Regulation of the Big Business 
of Human Egg Harvesting, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 391, 417 (2016) 
(arguing that “egg suppliers may also be deterred from legal action by 
feelings of regret and shame that may follow supplying eggs.”). 
61. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 60. 
62. See The Economist, supra note 44. 
63. For the difficulties in suing in legal systems where destination facilities 
are located, see Leigh Turner, ‘First World Health Care at Third World 
Prices’: Globalization, Bioethics and Medical Tourism, 2 BIOSOCIETIES 
303, 319-320 (2007); P. Mirrer-Singer, Medical Malpractice Overseas: The 
Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Medical Tourism, 70 L. CONTEMP. PROBL. 
211, 212 (2007); Elise Smith et al., Reproductive Tourism in Argentina: 
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differences, and travel costs might be an additional obstacle.64 The lack 
of clear standards or coherent international regulations means that 
cross-border markets facilitate externalities. 
An efficient and fair allocation of benefits depends on equal 
bargaining power and free choice.65 However, in the cross-border 
market, when bargaining power is unequal, people use the market to 
gain an unfair advantage, and challenge the element of effective 
distribution of risks and benefits.66 In both egg and surrogacy markets, 
women’s impoverished position is reflected in the cross-border 
reproductive markets. The next section reviews several market failures 
in both cross-border egg and surrogacy markets in lower-middle income 
countries: a questionable process to get informed consent, the violation 
of women’s health rights, improper medical standards, exploitative 
contracts and under-recognition. If certain characteristics are severe in 
one market but not the other, different regulative approaches will be 
justified. But if market failures raise similar concerns, there is no real 
reason to call for the regulation of just one market, or to regulate cross-
border egg markets differently from surrogacy markets. 
a. Market Compromises Autonomy - Informed Consent and Decision-
making 
Any medical procedure, in particular one that entails the medical 
risks discussed above, requires a women’s informed consent, which 
should be given after delivering her accurate information about the 
risks. Unfortunately, both markets raise concerns about information 
inadequacies, challenging the justifications that support permitting the 
market: maximization of autonomy and efficient distribution. In egg 
sales, the omission of information is structural, meaning the interest not 
to disclose all information is inherent to the practice.67 Some argue that 
physicians are under an inherent conflict of interest: doctors want to 
 
Clinic Accreditation and Its Implications for Consumers, Health 
Professionals and Policy Makers, 10 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 59, 60 
(2010). 
64. Turner, supra note 63. 
65. ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 20 (2012). 
66. WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 16 (1996). 
67. On problematic informed consent see, Jeffrey Kahn, Can We Broker Eggs 
without Making Omelets?, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 14, 14 (2001); Thomas J 
Papadimos & Alexa T Papadimos, The Student and the Ovum: The Lack 
of Autonomy and Informed Consent in Trading Genes for Tuition, 2 
REPROD. BIOL. ENDOCRINOL. 56 (2004). On professional conflict of 
interest, see Andrea L. Kalfoglou & Gail Geller, Navigating Conflict of 
Interest in Oocyte Donation: An Analysis of Donors’ Experiences, 10 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 226, 227 (2000) [hereinafter Kalfoglou 2000]. 
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maximize the opportunity to create more embryos by retrieving as 
many eggs as possible, but they are committed to the best interests of 
all patients, including those of the egg seller.68 Concerns have been 
raised that “physicians are not fully cognizant of this conflict because 
they don’t view the egg donor as a patient,”69 and thus compromise her 
best interests. Others claim that the medical risks of the procedures for 
egg harvesting are largely unknown.70 
The reports on surrogacy cases from India paint a similar picture. 
When procedures are carried out across borders in low-middle income 
countries, the incentive to provide such information may be low and 
the legal demand for informed consent seems to be somewhat fluid.71 
Often, consent forms do not provide all of the required information and 
put women at a disadvantage.72 Additionally, the known risks are 
measured in good healthcare systems that may eliminate many of the 
risks created by inadequate facilities.73 In countries with less-developed 
healthcare systems, the risks are likely to be higher due to less access 
to safe, sanitary healthcare facilities.74 Furthermore, for surrogates who 
do not read English, the translation of the consent form may not 
provide adequate information that should be a basis to a voluntary and 
informed consent. 75 When, due to insufficient information, women are 
unaware of the risks they are consenting to or do not understand the 
medical and legal procedures involved, they might fail to estimate the 
 
68. Vera, supra note 59, at 403. 
69. Judith F. Daar, Regulating the Fiction of Informed Consent in ART 
Medicine, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS, 19, 19 (2001). 
70. Vera, supra note 59, at 417. 
71. See Julie McCarthy, Why Some of India’s Surrogate Moms are Full of 
Regret, NPR (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/goats
andsoda/2016/09/18/494451674/why-some-of-indias-surrogate-moms-
are-full-of-regret. 
72. For concerns regarding informed consent in cross border transactions, see 
Saravanan, supra note 10, at 6; Richard F. Storrow, Quest for Conception: 
Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS 
L. J. 295, 314 (2006); Imrana Qadeer, Social and Ethical Basis of 
Legislation on Surrogacy: Need for Debate, 6 INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS 28, 
28 (2009) (arguing that the medical profession can be accused of 
supporting the inequality of power by using needy women). 
73. Id. 
74. SATZ 2010, supra note 41, at 196. 
75. Pande 2009, supra note 28, at 147; SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 
41 (reporting that 51.7% of the surrogate mothers in Anand were 
illiterate); SAMA–RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, BIRTHING 
A MARKET: A STUDY ON COMMERCIAL SURROGACY 40 (2012), available at 
http://www.communityhealth.in/~commun26/wiki/images/e/e8/Sama_
Birthing_A_Market.pdf [hereinafter SAMA]. 
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value of the contract, and their consent may not be truly informed. 
From a medical ethics and liberal legal standpoint, this situation does 
not constitute a truly autonomous choice.76 Information inadequacies or 
lack of transparency are a market failure that have legal and economic 
consequences, not only for surrogates, but also for intended parents. 
Intended parents may also suffer from lack of transparency and be 
asked to pay additional payment for every action that is not previously 
mentioned in the contract (such as, meeting the surrogate, or additional 
medical exams). 
Insufficient informed consent further compromises health rights.77 
Persons that lack knowledge are ill positioned to challenge the false of 
information given to them by mediators and clinics, thus they are 
weaker parties in the transaction. The impoverishment of women leads 
to disrespect and a lower medical standard during procedures. For 
example, according to the Indian Council of Medical Research 
guidelines, “no more than three oocytes or embryos may be placed in a 
woman in one treatment, regardless of the procedure/s used, except 
under exceptional circumstances.”78 Nevertheless, few reports mention 
the occurrence of transferring five or more healthy embryos back to the 
 
76. The legal/economic approach requires an expression of women’s 
autonomy to put their bodies through any medical risk. Ideally, if the 
market holds participants responsible for the consequences of their 
actions, then in order to transact reproductive capacities participants 
should have complete information on the process and consent to it. 
Medically, patients have the right not to be treated unless they give an 
informed consent to the process they are about to undergo. See, The 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNESCO, art. 6, 
Oct. 19, 2005, SHS/EST/05/CONF.204/3 REV (conditioning any medical 
intervention on prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned, 
based on adequate information). 
77. Sharon Bassan, Can Human Rights Protect Surrogate women in The 
Cross-Border Market?, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ELIMINATION 
OF DISCRIMINATION 620 (M. Jänterä-Jareborg& H. Tigroudja eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Bassan, 2016] 
78. SAMA, supra note 75, at 89 fn.3. The Indian Council of Medical Research 
(ICMR), NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, SUPERVISION & 
REGULATION OF ART CLINICS IN INDIA ART. 3.2.7, 3.5.12 (2005), 
http://icmr.nic.in/art/art_clinics.htm. 
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surrogate in the pursuit of more profit.79 This risks higher rates of 
multiple pregnancies and endangers the woman and the fetuses.80 
Some argue that cross-border markets rely on particular positions 
of assisting women in lower-middle-income countries, making them 
more available for the commercialization of reproductive commodities.81 
Pande argues that the surrogates in Anand are especially attractive not 
just because they provide cheap services due to economic desperation, 
but because their vulnerability makes it possible to subject them to 
further control by the doctor and the consumers.82 The details of the 
procedure and its results are not necessarily shared with the 
surrogates.83 For example, one surrogate stated that “when I went in, I 
was given an injection and told nothing about what they were going to 
do. Even at home I was not informed that something like this will 
happen.”84 Surrogates may be forced to terminate the pregnancy if the 
intended parents desire, and cannot make an independent decision 
regarding their body, for example, whether to keep the pregnancy or 
abort.85 The surrogate is also deprived of any part in deciding how she 
will relinquish the child.86 From fear that she might refuse to relinquish 
the child, the clinic, consumers, and at times mediators make all 
decisions.87 Similar disrespect is evident in egg provision cases. Nahman 
 
79. Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender 
Justice, 24 Bioethics 323, 328 (2010); Saravanan, supra note 10, at 8 
(reporting that when more than one embryo was conceived, selective 
abortion was performed) ; SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 44 
(reporting the transfer of five or more healthy embryos back to the 
surrogate, and women that go through 20-25 cycles of IVF treatment, 
against all professional guidelines) ; SAMA, supra note 75 , at 66. 
80. Donchin, supra note 78, at, 328; Saravanan, supra note 10, at 8; SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 44; SAMA, supra note 75, at 66. 
81. For egg market see, Nahman, supra note 19 (arguing that “privatized 
transnational oocyte traffic relies on such global inequalities”); for 
surrogacy market see Qadeer, supra note 72, at 29 (arguing that the 
medical profession can be accused of supporting the inequality of power 
by using needy women). 
82. Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect 
Mother-Worker, 35 Signs 969, 980 (2010) [hereinafter Pande 2010]. 
83. SAMA, supra note 75, at 63-69. 
84. SAMA, supra note 75, at 62 SP3’s interview. 
85. Qadeer, supra note 72, at 31; SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 5, 29, 
45, 78 (the decision regarding the continuation of pregnancy in cases of 
an abnormality is rarely taken with the surrogate (only 2.9% of 
respondents in Surat had a say), and usually includes only the clinic and 
the intended parents). 
86. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 75. 
87. Id. at 66. 
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describes a situation she observed in Romania, where the focus was on 
getting the eggs, and the egg provider seemed to be unnoticed and 
unattended by the medical staff when she required assistance.88 She 
concludes that this is only possible because assisting women are 
perceived as raw material that serve to create future children for 
infertile individuals, and as a source of profit for fertility clinics.89 
A major market failure entailed in lower medical standards and the 
violation of health rights is the opportunity assisting women have to 
change their minds. This is a consequential failure for both egg and 
surrogacy markets, given the small window of opportunity available in 
each procedure. Egg sellers may only withdraw their consent up to the 
fertilization stage, which occurs within a few hours after egg retrieval.90 
After the egg is fertilized it contains genetic material from at least one 
other person, and belongs to the intended parents. In surrogacy, during 
pregnancy, once the embryo is implanted inside her body, a surrogate 
cannot gain back control even if she withdraws her consent, unless she 
pays the great physical and emotional price of abortion.91 It is not easy 
to “quit the contract.” In many countries surrogacy contracts are 
subject to legal limitations on the possibility of aborting. Moreover, a 
surrogate may also have to compensate the intended parents for the 
loss of their genetic embryo and for breach of contract.92 It is hardly 
realistic that a surrogate will exercise this right when her motivation to 
supply reproductive services is financial in nature. These obstacles 
might make the breach not worthwhile and may force a surrogate to go 
on with a contract, which, in many other contexts would be considered 
servitude. 93 
 
88. Nahman, supra note 19 (“There’s no heart monitor, as there were in other 
Israeli clinics. She just gets an injection of white liquid in the arm and an 
intravenous drip . . . they still cannot get the machine to work. Finally 
they call in Nakhum to help. The young egg donor is still lying asleep. No 
one is checking that she is still breathing. Ten minutes go by; they are 
still focused around a machine . . . Now the young woman is waking up – 
no one notices. When they do notice they tell her to lie still. She talks 
and they ignore her. The egg-donor-in-waiting sits up – grabs the doctor 
and makes her pay attention gently. But they are still fiddling with the 
aspirator. The patient gets up. The doctor says, ‘stai a coloputsin’ 
(translated from Romanian: ‘stay there a little’) to gently calm her.”). 
89. Id. 
90. ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. OF CHICAGO, https://www.advanced
fertility.com/aspiration.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
91. See SATZ 2010, supra note 41, at 132. 
92. Qadeer, supra note 72, at 30 (reporting “cases of the surrogate refusing to 
part with the baby, but being unable to pay back the sum received”). 
93. See Allen, supra note 41, at 142. See also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: 
THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 80-81 (1986) (warning against 
recognizing slavery contracts, which might send a message of indifference 
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Compromised informed consent and autonomous decision-making 
are common market failures justifying the regulation of both markets. 
If we value space for choice and decisions, regulation must ensure that 
information will be transparent and known to women before and during 
the period of the contract. Regulations should require easy access to 
accurate information through public channels.94 Centralized regulation 
could provide a single framework that subjects each market to 
mandatory medical guidelines and regulations that protect basic health 
and human rights, assure safeguards for medical standards, and 
minimize extensive control. 
b. Market Compromises Contractual Benefits 
Another type of market failure is the unfair distribution of 
contractual benefits due to the power imbalance between the assisting 
women and intended parents. In both developed and developing 
countries, financial incentives seem necessary to engage women in 
reproductive markets.95 However, socioeconomic disparity is greater in 
the context of low-middle income countries.96 Accordingly, these 
services are undervalued and underpaid compared to the same 
transactions in affluent countries.97 This is typical in both markets. Egg 
sales in affluent countries vary from $1,500 to $150,000, with a reported 
compensation rate of between $4,217 and $5,200 per cycle.98 In 
comparison, Romanian transactions valued at $200 pay for 
 
towards society, implying that it abandons reckless members who choose 
to enter these contracts. This could lead to a general decrease of care and 
compassion in society.). 
94. Baldwin, Cave & Martin, supra note 65, at 19. 
95. See Stephen Wilkinson, Exploitation in International Paid Surrogacy 
Arrangements, 33 J. OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 125, 129 (2016). 
96. On financial incentives in the recruitment of egg providers, see The Ethics 
Committee, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial 
Incentives in Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 82 FERTIL. & STERIL. (SUPPL. 
1) S240, S240 (2004) [hereinafter The Ethics Committee]; On financial 
incentives in the recruitment of surrogates, see sources cited supra note 
28. 
97. See Darlena Cunha, The Hidden Cost of International Surrogacy, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/12/the-hidden-costs-of-international-surrogacy/382757/. 
98. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1760 
(2009) (explaining that provider compensation data is of “questionable 
reliability” as it is taken from surveys of fertility clinics and donor agencies 
listed with SART, so these figures may understate actual averages). See 
also Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 
MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 255, 259 (2004) (claiming that the high amounts 
are only incentives to attract potential providers but have not been paid 
to anyone). 
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approximately 20 eggs.99 The surrogate’s base fee in the United States 
is between $20,000 and $55,000 in addition to payment for her expenses 
and other negotiable fees.100 In India, surrogates receive between $2,500 
to $7,000, about 10%-20% of the total amount the intended parents pay 
the clinic.101 Different pricing does not necessarily indicate exploitation, 
since conditions in destination states differ from those in the affluent 
states. The measurement of fairness is not an absolute evaluation, but 
a relational one that depends on the context.102 However, even if lower 
reimbursement does not necessarily mean that the transaction is unfair, 
lower protections for extended externalities and increased contractual 
risks do.103 
For example, in many United States contracts, the intended parents 
cover a surrogate’s expenses for an independent lawyer.104 The lawyer 
ensures that the surrogate receives everything related to her medical 
condition, and that she is protected from fraud. She receives medical 
expenses related to the pregnancy, health insurance for her and her 
family for the entire pregnancy, and expenses—including maternity care 
and clothing.105 She also has the privilege of choosing her clients (the 
intended parents).106 In India these norms do not apply. The contracts 
usually regulate issues directly related to the fetus. Surrogacy contracts 
 
99. Michal Nahman, Nodes of Desire: Romanian Egg Sellers, ‘Dignity’ and 
Feminist Alliances in Transnational Ova Exchanges, 15 EUR. J. WOMEN’S 
STUD. 65, 77 (2008) [hereinafter Nahman, 2008]. 
100. Zoe M. Beiner, Note, Signed, Sealed Delivered- Not Yours: Why the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Offers a Framework for Regulating Gestational 
Surrogacy, 71 VAND. L. REV. 285, 293 (2018), Ertman, supra note 8, at 
11; Vida Panitch, Surrogate Tourism and Reproductive Rights, 28 
HYPATIA 274, 282 (2013); Surrogates Compensation and Benefits, CIRCLE 
SURROGACY, http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/surrogates/how-much-
do-surrogates-get-paid (last visited July 10, 2014); Gestational Surrogate 
Program Fee Schedule – 2014, CONCEIVABILITY, http://www.
conceiveabilities.com/parents_surrogate_fees.htm (last visited July 10, 
2014). 
101. Saravanan, supra note 10, at 11 (reporting that the highest payment made 
to a surrogate was $9,724. The particular consumer wanted to pay more, 
but the doctor refused. “This could prompt such demands and 
unnecessarily raise expectations from other surrogate mothers as well.”). 
102. Bassan, 2016, supra note 77. 
103. See The Economist, supra note 44. 
104. Qadeer, supra note 72, at 29-30. 
105. Id. 
106. See, e.g., Surrogate Mother Program, THE SURROGACY http://www.th
esurrogacysource.com/sg_about.htm (last visited April 1, 2014) (“you 
will be presented with profiles to select your intended parents, you will 
meet with our staff and intended parents to make sure that this is the 
right couple for you.”). 
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address issues of compensation, the type of procedure, psychological 
testing, psychiatric evaluation of the surrogate, and how many times 
the surrogate can attempt surrogacy.107 They emphasize that the 
surrogate has no genetic connection to the children and that she will 
relinquish the child (a healthy child108) and any right to it immediately 
after birth.109 It does not stipulate any conditions governing the 
surrogate’s well-being with respect to health insurance coverage, nor 
does it establish an allocation of responsibility in the event of 
complications or death during or as a result of the pregnancy.110 The 
surrogates’ future after the process ends (medical and social) is 
uninsured by the contract, even though some surrogates are not 
accepted back by their families.111 
Such detailed information is not available on egg donation. Rather, 
the literature shows that even in domestic egg markets, there are many 
compromises on contract protections of egg providers.112 For example, 
Andrea L. Kalfoglou and Gail Geller mention a case where clinics did 
not inform providers that they faced the risk of hyper-stimulation and 
“women were billed for medical expenses for follow-up care and medical 
complications, even though both were promised that the clinic would 
cover these costs.”113 
Regulation could intervene to encourage the operation of healthy, 
fair competitive markets, demanding, for example, a separate medical 
professional to care for assisting women, proper insurance etc., as 
discussed below in section IV(a). A single model of regulation could 
coordinate the market and assign a division of liability among 
 
107. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 43-44. 
108. Sharon Bassan, Fair Trade as an Instrument for the Regulation of Risk 
in the Cross-Border Surrogacy Market, 4 EJRR 750, 753 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bassan, Fair Trade]; SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 5, 
29 (mentioning cases in which couples refused to take a baby of a specific 
sex, or when a defective baby was born and they filed suit against the 
surrogate arguing she had broken the contract); SAMA, supra note 75, at 
107. 
109. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 43-44. 
110. Qadeer, supra note 72, at 31; SAMA, supra note 75, at 93. Holly Williams, 
India’s Surrogate Mothers Exploited?, CBSNEWS, (April 11, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50144661n (telling the story 
of a surrogate, mother of two, who died due to complications. Her contract 
had no clause to protect her and her children from such risk.). 
111. Saravanan, supra note 10, at 9 (“very little social and psychological 
support was given to the surrogates in the clinic, leaving them feeling 
miserable post-relinquishment.”); SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 76; 
SAMA, supra note 75, at 71. 
112. Vera, supra note 59 at 391; Kalfoglou 2000, supra note 67. 
113. Kalfoglou 2000, supra note 67, at 231, 236. 
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participants that reflects their responsibilities, powers and capacities in 
the market-- thereby safeguarding the interests of all participants. 
c. A Market Compromises Recognition 
The market interfaces not only with economic dimensions, but also 
with other social and personal dimensions that are currently harmed 
and should be addressed by regulation. Where the market is dominant, 
commodities mediate membership and recognition.114 Recognition is a 
function of norms of appreciation, which depends upon a moral 
understanding of persons and their positions. Recognition is neither a 
personal attribute dependent on self-will nor is it necessarily universal. 
Rather, it is concerned with the institutionalized cultural patterns of 
acceptance, appreciation and valuation of people’s contribution.115 
Recognition is a condition for full human flourishing in a society that 
forms and defines people’s identities as individuals. Therefore, recognition 
is necessary for seizing opportunities, and underlies individuals’ self-
esteem, which is achieved through participation in the market, among 
other structures.116 Indeed, egg recruitment and carrying a pregnancy 
to term involve different efforts, thus may entail different moral 
understandings of surrogates and egg providers and their social positions. 
Should egg providers and surrogates be differentially recognized? 
The current operation of both markets reflects the power imbalance 
whereby the contributions, needs and interests of both egg providers 
and surrogates are undervalued and their agency is often under-
recognized. For example, in lower-middle income countries, surrogates 
cannot choose their “clients” or the terms of connections with them— 
rights that women in countries like the United States have.117 While the 
intended parents can choose the profile of their surrogate,118 the identity 
of the intended family is not disclosed to surrogates to decide whether  
114. WALZER, supra note 2, at 106. On recognition, see id. at chap. 11; Axel 
Honneth, Recognition and Justice Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice, 
47 ACTASOCIOLOGICA 351, 351 (2004). 
115. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 56 
(2008) (connecting recognition and justice, since public recognition 
establishes a public basis for viewing others as worthy of respect, and thus 
supports self-respect). 
116. On self-esteem and self-respect, see WALZER, supra note 2, at 272-80. 
117. E.g., Surrogates Can Choose Their Intended Parents, EXTRAORDINARY 
CONCEPTION, https://www.extraconceptions.com/surrogates-can-choose-
their-intended-parents/. 
118. Charlotte Kroløkke, The Commodification of Motherhood: Surrogacy as 
a Matter of Choice, in CONTEMPLATING MATERNITY IN AN ERA OF CHOICE: 
EXPLORATIONS INTO DISCOURSES OF REPRODUCTION 95, 105 (Sara Hayden 
& D. Lynn O’Brien Hallstein eds., 2010); Global Surrogacy Company In 
India, GLOBALIVF (Feb. 21, 2013), http://globalivf.com/2013/02/
21/india-surrogates-egg-donor-global-fertility-centre/. 
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to enter the transaction.119 The surrogates may meet the intended 
parents for the first time when they sign the contract, at which point 
they lack a meaningful choice.120 After birth, especially in cross-border 
transactions, surrogates have limited connection to the parents and 
usually no shared experience with the child, unless the parents choose 
otherwise.121 Similarly, egg providers usually do not meet the recipients 
or choose the profile of people who will eventually raise their genetic 
offspring.122 Guidelines often state that “once the donation has taken 
place, the recipient retains all rights over the disposition of the 
embryos,”123 so the provider does not have a relationship with the future 
child. The lack of recognition or appreciation may be an important 
component for women when deciding whether to participate in such a 
contract. Recognition is reciprocal in character.124 When people 
cooperate, but one is appreciated and the other treated as disposable 
or invisible, the latter is under-recognized.125 
Both egg and surrogacy markets raise a common need for a 
regulative model. The cross-border reproductive market harms assisting 
women because they are treated as socially inferior to others. When 
class power dominates a market, recognition is unjustly distorted, 
 
119. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 35 (46% of the surrogate mothers 
knew the intended parents only by face and name. Nevertheless, due to 
language barriers and the constant presence of the medical staff there was 
never any one-to-one communication between the two parties, and the 
relationship, although harmonious, remained distant.); SAMA, supra note 
75, at 45. Rabinowitz, supra note 48. 
120. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 35; SAMA, supra note 75, at 100 
(reporting a case where the surrogate was told she would not be allowed 
to meet the consumers throughout the entire process). 
121. Saravanan, supra note 10, at 9. 
122. See Wendy Kramer, DNA=Donors Not Anonymous, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/wendy-kramer/dna-
donors-not-anonymous_1_b_8646164.html. 
123. Andrea L. Kalfoglou & Gail Geller, A Follow-up Study with Oocyte Donors 
Exploring Their Experiences, Knowledge, and Attitudes About the Use of 
Their Oocytes and the Outcome of the Donation, 74 FERTIL. STERIL. 660, 
666 (2000) [hereinafter Kalfoglou & Geller]. 
124. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in NEW CONTEXTS OF 
CANADIAN CRITICISM 98, 112 (Ajay Heble, et al. eds., 1997) (exploring 
reciprocal aspects of recognition through Rousseau’s theory). 
125. Joshua Shaw, What Do Gestational Mothers Deserve?, ETHICAL THEORY 
AND MORAL PRACTICE 1, 3 (2016) (“there is something ungrateful about 
dismissing gestational mothers from considerations involving the 
wellbeing of children they have carried to term given the effort involved 
in pregnancy.”). 
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resulting in disrespected groups who internalize lower social esteem.126 
It influences the way those women perceive and think about themselves. 
Egg sellers acknowledge socioeconomic disparities between them and 
the consumers: “unfortunately, the eggs are going to people who can 
afford to buy them, rather than to poor people.”127 Similarly, a 
surrogate’s narrative expresses her disposability: 
The couple and the family had become like a family to me. They 
treated me very well throughout the pregnancy. But on the day 
of the delivery their [behavior] started changing. First they were 
reluctant to let me see the baby. When the nurses brought her 
over to me, [the intended mother] started instructing the nurse to 
give me pills, to stop my breast milk! I had just delivered her 
baby and all she could think of is that I should not be allowed to 
feed the baby!128 
The under-valuation of assisting women’s contribution exacerbates 
under-recognition and disempowerment of women in the market. It 
aggravates women’s lower social position as third-world women and 
their internalization of their marginalized gendered class.129 This further 
diminish their recognition as agents in the market and shapes the way 
an entire class is perceived by others. In these cases, market mechanisms 
fail to produce results consistent with the public interest.130 
 
126. SATZ 1992, supra note 41, at 94. See WALZER, supra note 2, at 258-59 
(suggesting that it does not necessarily have to be the case). 
127. Id. at 73; see also SAMA, supra note 75, at 106. 
128. Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Nine Months of Labor? 
219 (May, 2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts - 
Amherst). 
129. SATZ 2010, supra note 41, at 130; Allen, supra note 41, at 148 (expressing 
concerns that minority women will become the “surrogate class”). 
Compare Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: 
Gifts for Global Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 618, 623-24 (2011) 
(showing how words used by surrogates shed light on the inequities 
inherent to the structure by indicating their feeling of ‘gratefulness’ at the 
attempts of the couple to build a relationship with them despite these 
differences) with HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERS: CONCEPTION IN 
THE HEART 54 (1994) (noting that surrogates in developed countries often 
do not perceive the class difference between them and the couple as 
significant). Similar observations were made regarding egg providers in 
Romania, who distanced themselves from the clinic and from intended 
parents both socially and economically. 
130. Cf., Lawrence Cohen, Where It Hurts: Indian Material for an Ethics of 
Organ Transplantation, DAEDALUS 135, 148 (1999) (showing that in areas 
in India where kidney selling is relatively common, creditors place 
additional pressures on those who owe them money). This demonstrates 
the possibility of the market reaching an optimal point. It might be that 
without the market, people who did not want to sell their organs would 
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Under-recognizing women’s agency results in stigma. Economic, 
religious, or political conditions intensify stereotypical conceptions and 
shape beliefs about the female role in society.131 As a consequence, some 
women—egg providers and surrogates—report that they do not reveal 
their occupation to family and friends.132 Some surrogates in India tell 
their neighbors that “they gave away their child or that the baby 
died.”133 Some egg sellers in Romania refrain from telling the families 
they have undergone the procedure, either to assert their own authority 
over their bodies or because they are ashamed.134 For example, egg 
provider Elena explains: “I feel shame to win the money in this way. I 
believe it’s not a help for me, because I don’t really work for this money. 
I prefer to work for this money, but in this case it came and it was easy. 
It’s like a weakness.”135 Although stigma is not necessarily an indication 
of a market failure, it is still a direct consequence of lack of recognition 
 
not have felt obligated to do so. Opening this choice for the poor will 
affect those who do not want to participate in such markets. 
131. For the reasons for the stigma in India, especially equating it with sex, 
see Pande 2009 supra note 28, at 154-55 (explaining that in addition to 
the common stigma involved with surrogacy (of getting pregnant for 
money, which is associated with the ‘immoral’ commercialization of 
motherhood) there are cultural and social explanations for the stigma: 
surrogacy entails giving away the baby as soon as it is born, reiterates the 
disposability of these ‘desperate’ women, and emphasizes the ‘unnatural’ 
nature of their motherhood; surrogates are portrayed in the media as 
having some kind of ‘relation’ (sexual or emotional) with the intended 
father. Many Indians equate surrogacy with sex work.). 
132. See Surrogacy Still Stigmatized, Though Attitudes Changing Among 
Younger Women, SCIENCE DAILY (July 7, 2008), https://www.scienced
aily.com/releases/2008/07/080706194247.htm. 
133. Id. at 150. E.g. id.at 154 (reporting that all the surrogates in her study 
except one decided to keep their surrogacy a secret from their 
communities, villages and, very often, from their parents. They usually 
hid in the clinic or took temporary accommodation away from their 
communities during the last months of pregnancy. Some decided to tell 
their neighbors that the babies were their own and later say that they 
had miscarried.); Qadeer, supra note 72, at 30; SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra 
note 36, at 52, 61 (more than half of the surrogates in the research said 
that they did not want to admit they were surrogates because of the 
stigma, so they stayed away during pregnancy); id .at 57 (surrogates 
consider the secrecy to be the worst part of the process); SAMA, supra 
note 75, at 122; Abigail Haworth, Surrogate Mothers: Womb for Rent, 
MARIE CLAIRE (July 29, 2007), http://www.marieclaire.com/world-
reports/news/surrogate-mothers-india?click=main_sr. 
134. Nahman, 2008, supra note 99, at 72 (“I feel shame to win the money in 
this way”); Nahman, supra note 19, at 629. 
135. Nahman, 2008 supra note 99, at 72. 
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of women in the reproductive markets.136 Stigma might attach 
differently to egg recruitment, which is not physically visible in the way 
that pregnancy is and egg providers may face less stigma than 
surrogates. 
Additionally, both markets result in discrimination, the kind often 
disregarded by the state and raises a violation of the right not to be 
discriminated against. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (art. 2) requires the state 
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organization or enterprise.137 The Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted within the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 
declaration) (art. 11) states that no individual or group shall be 
discriminated against or stigmatized on any grounds, in violation of 
human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.138 Often, 
states are not in compliance with their duties to protect these women 
against discrimination, and women’s inferior position created by that 
discrimination is not addressed. Regulation should acknowledge conditions 
of inequality and aspire to contribute to the development and recognition 
of all involved, even those coming from unequal backgrounds. Regulation 
should correct the conduct of the market and focus on recognition of 
persons and their market positions and contributions. 
To conclude, it seems that the regulation of cross-border egg and 
surrogacy markets finds justification from a combination of rationales. 
One stems from the acknowledgement of asymmetry in bargaining 
positions had the intervention not taken place.139 A second stems from 
market failures, externalities and evidence of exploitative practices. A 
third reflects the need to enhance societal recognition of market 
participants. Even though these justifications apply to both markets, 
currently only the surrogacy market encourages initiatives for regulation. 
 
136. Wertheimer, supra note 66, at106 (arguing that the way a practice is 
regarded by the society does not necessarily mean that we should condemn 
the practice. It could be a reason to condemn society’s reaction.). 
137. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13 
138. UNESCO. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. (2005). 
139. Sharon Bassan, Shared Responsibility Regulation Model for Cross-Border 
Reproductive Transactions, 37 MICH. J. INT’L, 229, 335 (2016) [hereinafter 
Bassan, Shared Responsibility]. 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Different but Same: A Call for a Joint Pro-Active Regulation of Cross-
Border Egg and Surrogacy Markets 
351 
III. The Different Interests in Cross-Border Egg and 
Surrogacy Regulation 
This section considers why there is more pressure to regulate 
surrogacy markets rather than egg markets. Initiatives for regulation 
usually stem from the intended parents’ countries—most of which 
restrict domestic transactions of this sort—who are not the obvious 
duty bearers in cross-border markets.140 Assisting women’s states are 
the naturally responsible authority for amending injustices stemming 
from transactions that are signed and executed in their jurisdiction, 
place their citizens in physical risk, and bear the potential to infringe 
citizens’ rights.141 These states have the domestic prerogative to 
minimize the negative effects on their citizens and ensure the 
implementation of human rights within their territory. 
Despite this power, the initiative for international regulation comes 
from the home country of the intended parents because the home 
country must register their citizens’ children born through surrogacy 
markets. In cross-border transactions, the legal parenthood of intended 
parents is either established in the state of birth, since most countries 
automatically give parenthood to the woman giving birth,142 and then 
confirmed by the consumers’ state, or must be acquired when parents 
return to their home country.143 In order to find a practical solution to 
children appearing at their border, consumers’ states acknowledge the 
consequences of market transactions and register children born through 
the cross-border surrogacy transactions, even if, domestically, such 
transactions would be considered illegitimate.144 Countries such as the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and New Zealand 
ban commercial surrogacy but give citizenship and parental rights to 
children born from cross-border reproductive transactions.145 For 
 
140. For establishing such a responsibility for consumer countries, see Bassan 
Shared Responsibility, supra note 139, at 321. 
141. Bassan, Fair Trade, supra note 108, at 755. 
142. For exceptions, see Codigo Civil [CC] [Civil Code] art. 347, Diario Oficial 
de la Federation [DOF] 14-05-1928, ultimas reformas DOF 13-04-2007 
(Mex.); for Ukraine see, Family Code of Ukraine art. 123(2); Usha 
Rengachary Smerdon, India, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY 
ARRANGEMENTS: LEGAL REGULATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 193 
(Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont eds., 2013) (stating that the 
intended mother is considered to be the legal mother). 
143. Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 53, at 504. 
144. Id. at 514-18. 
145. For England see Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, 
§ 54(8) (Eng.); Embryonenschutzgesetz [ESchG] [The Embryo Protection 
Act] Dec. 13, 1990, art. 1(1), No.1 & 2 (Ger.); for the Netherlands, see 
Artikel 151b lid 1A SR. and Artikel 273f lid 4 SR.; for New Zealand, see 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 § 14(3) (N.Z.); for 
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example, in the United Kingdom, the courts permitted the recognition 
of children that were born in cross-border transactions despite the 
“significant” amounts of money parents spend. 146 
The European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”)’s recent 
rulings demonstrate that consumers’ states might have a duty—not a 
choice—to register the resulting children.147 In Mennesson v. France, 
Labassee v. France, and Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy , the ECtHR 
addressed countries’ refusal to recognize the parent-child relationships 
that were legally created through cross-border surrogacy markets, due 
to insistence to keep national public policy.148 In the Mennesson v. 
France case, despite a United States judgment acknowledging the 
parenthood of intended parents, the French authorities refused to 
register the child.149 The French court held that registering the child as 
a French citizen would contradict the principle of inalienability of civil 
status, and the French Civil Code as a matter of public policy.150 The 
parents, brought the case before the ECtHR, arguing that the refusal 
violates the right to respect for their private and family life (Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights), but the court upheld 
the refusal to acknowledge parents-child relationship on this ground.151 
Nevertheless, different children rights related to privacy and identity  
France, see Loi 94-653 du 29 juillet 1994 de Code Penal [Law 94-653 of 
July 29, 1994 of Penal Code] art. 227-12, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Sept. 19, 2000. 
146. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 54(8) (Eng.) 
enables courts to consider whether no money or other benefit (other than 
for expenses reasonably incurred) has been given or received by either of 
the applicants when authorizing a parental order. See Denis Campbell, 
Couples Who Pay Surrogate Mothers Could Lose Right to Raise the Child, 
THE GUARDIAN (April 5, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010
/apr/05/surrogacy-parents-ivf. 
147. See Sharon Bassan, Cross-Border Surrogacy Transactions (Cbst): Can 
Consumers’ States Choose Whether Or Not to Regulate?, 
VOLKERRECHTSBLOG (July 20, 2016), http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/cross-
border-surrogacy-transactions-cbst/. 
148. Mennesson v. France, App. No.. 65192/11, Judgment 26 June 2014. 
Judgment of the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights; 
Labassee v. France, App.No. 65941/11, Judgment 26 June 2014. 
Judgment of the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The same judges as in the Mennesson case but the judgment is unavailable 
in English; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, App. No.. 25358/12 
Judgment 27 January 2015. Judgment of the Twelfth Section of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Unavailable in English. 
149. Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11, Judgment 26 June 2014. 
Judgment of the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. the Mennessons’ and the Labassees’ applications were jointly lodged 
and discussed. 
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were considered justified in order to recognize parent-child relationship 
established abroad through cross-border surrogacy markets in 
accordance with the best interest of the child.152 Similar ruling was given 
in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, whose circumstances 
were slightly different.153 According to the ECtHR ruling, the 
authorities have an international obligation to protect the best interests 
of the child that outweighs their obligation to national public policy or 
even to the minimal demand to ensure surrogates’ health rights and 
safe procedure. This could lead to registration of children even in cases 
where they are the result of an unethical and risky procedures. 
The surrogacy market, which results in living children, yields few 
initiatives for international regulation surrounding the interests of 
resulting children and their registration. On a diplomatic level, some 
states’ authorities have attempted to prevent registration difficulties. 
For example, in 2010, offices of Consuls General representing eight 
European states jointly authored a cease-and-desist letter to several 
Indian clinics, demanding that they consult with those states’ embassies 
prior to providing any surrogacy services to their citizens. 154 The United 
Kingdom took a separate approach and issued guidance for prospective 
parents which aimed to educate them before starting the surrogacy 
process.155 Before Thailand banned provision of surrogacy services to 
foreigners, the Israel embassy in Bangkok approached the Thai Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to inquire about hiring female Thai nationals as 
surrogate mothers by Israelis.156 In this way, they could verify the  
152. Id. at para. 99. 
153. The case of Paradiso was different from the Mennesson case, in the sense 
that the child concerned was genetically unrelated to either of the 
intended parents. The Italian authorities addressed it as international 
adoption case rather than a cross-border surrogacy transaction. 
154. IVF Centres Direct Foreigners to Consulates over Surrogacy Issue, 
HINDUSTANTIMES (July 15, 2010), www.hindustantimes.com/India-
news/Mumbai/IVF-centres-direct-foreigners-to-consulates-over-
surrogacy-issue/Article1-572534.aspx. 
155. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SURROGACY OVERSEAS, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/324487/Surrogacy_overseas__updated_June_14_.pdf (last 
updated June 26, 2014). 
156. Thailand Bans Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 49 and Letter no. 
1403/2756 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to the Embassy of 
Israel, Bangkok (Dec. 12, 2013) (on file with the author) (clarifying that 
the law grants Thai citizenship to any child born to a Thai mother. 
Additionally, the letter states that Thailand does not yet have specific 
regulation on this issue, but an act that had recently been drafted 
explicitly prohibited commercial surrogacy. Therefore, at that time the 
Thai position neither supported nor encouraged the phenomenon and 
considered it in contravention of the Thai Anti Human Trafficking Act 
B.E. 2551 (2008).). 
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legality of the procedure and ensure that the resulting child could have 
citizenship. Countries where foreigners come for surrogacy services have 
also taken action. An Indian Bill attempted to require consumers to 
show that the resulting child could be recognized as their child by their 
home state and registered accordingly.157 The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (“HCCH”) is currently investigating the 
prospects of a convention on the regulation of cross-border surrogacy 
markets, based on the model of international adoption.158 
Although motives for regulation apply to both markets, no parallel 
actions exist to regulate the international cross-border egg market,159 
where there is no existing child whose rights may be infringed. The 
Italian government stated that it banned donor gametes domestically 
in order to affirm that only heterosexual couples are an appropriate 
type of family formation, because it feared that approving of homosexual 
families would cause harm to children and society.160 Without condemning 
or supporting this position, the Italian government should have an 
interest in preventing or reducing such harms regardless of the source 
of the egg. The wish to affirm that only heterosexual couples are an 
appropriate type of family formation does not change whether the child 
is a result of a domestic or foreign gamete. Nevertheless, despite the 
national concern for potential harms to children and society, the law 
acknowledges parental rights over children born as a result of cross-
border egg transaction. 161 
There was one domestic effort to monitor the cross-border market. 
In 2009, Romania charged Israeli physicians for trading eggs taken from 
Romanian women and implanting them in Israeli women.162 This, 
however, was a national Romanian action, since trafficking was 
considered an offense in Romania. The unilateral action did not fuel 
any international initiative to correct market failures. Moreover, while 
 
157. Indian Council of Medical Research, The Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2010, Ministry of Health & Family 
Welfare (India), available at http://icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20RE
GULATION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf. 
158. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, https://www.
hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2014). 
159. Carmel Shalev & Gabriela Werner-Felmayer, Patterns of Globalized 
Reproduction: Egg Cells Regulation in Israel and Austria, 15 ISRAEL J. 
HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1, 8 (2012). 
160. Storrow, supra note 72, at 306-307. 
161. Storrow, supra note 72, at 306-07. 
162. Nahman, supra note 19, at 629 (demonstrating that “the physicians’ 
actions were in violation of Romanian law that prohibits payment for 
human ova and organs, therefore the destination country (Romania) 
pressed charges”). 
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this case may have had good intentions, it does not remedy cases of 
cross-border reproductive markets that do not rise to the level of 
trafficking. 
Regulation initiated solely for the sake of facilitating registration of 
parent-child relations and citizenship does not necessarily support the 
best interests of assisting women because it is not motivated by 
consideration of those interests.163 However, regulations could and 
should focus more on assisting women, as the two regulative approaches 
explored below emphasize. 
IV. How to Regulate the Market? 
Two possible regulatory models could better serve the interests of 
assisting women. A minimalist legal-economic model would require a 
framework to ensure that there are medical, ethical and safety 
conditions to protect women. By contrast, a more pro-active approach 
would also address the personal and social implication of under-
recognition. Although the following section supports the inclusive pro-
active approach, it shows that either approach requires adopting a 
single regulative framework for both egg and surrogacy markets. 
a. Minimalistic Risk Regulation Model - Standardization and Basic 
Rights 
Providing reproductive services without proper medical care 
endangers assisting women and the resulting children, and violates their 
rights. This is an undesirable consequence for assisting women, the 
child, the intended parents and their countries.164 Regulation could 
 
163. For a review of scholarly work, see Nicky Hudson, et al., Cross-Border 
Reproductive Care: A Review of the Literature, 22 REPROD. BIOMED. 
ONLINE 673, 683 (2011) (pointing-out that the literature regarding the 
regulation of cross-border reproductive markets has mainly focused on 
issues concerning the infertile couples or, on the resulting children (the 
difficulties of traveling to another country, and the need to beware of 
foreseeable medical harm to the future child, or to the intended mother)); 
see Storrow, supra note 72, at 324-25. Regarding surrogacy, see Marcia 
C. Inhorn & Pasquale Patrizio, Rethinking Reproductive “Tourism” as 
Reproductive “Exile”, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 904 (2009). Regarding 
egg sale, see Naomi Pfeffer, Eggs-Ploiting Women: A Critical Feminist 
Analysis of the Different Principles in Transplant and Fertility Tourism, 
23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 634, 638 (2011) (pointing out that even 
the ESHRE Code of Practice is patient-centered, focused on how to ensure 
that clinics in destination countries offer safe and effective care to their 
clients, but does not mention the welfare of egg vendors). 
164. The medical risks entailed have secondary impact for states that goes 
beyond the individual transaction. Medical complications can burden the 
healthcare systems in both consumers’ and destination countries. The 
children born from the procedure might receive unsatisfactory care, or 
import diseases into the consumers’ country. Consumers’ countries might 
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benefit all participants potentially harmed. A minimalistic risk-
regulation model could protect the parties’ basic rights and minimize 
negative implications, whether for egg or surrogacy markets. Such a 
model would ensure that the market operates according to proper 
medical standards underwritten by clear professional, medical and 
safety guidelines for each procedure which ensure that no human rights 
are violated. 
The main concern with respect to the differences between egg and 
surrogacy markets is in the medical risks involved. But this difference 
does not require a different regulative model. Medical standards are 
modular and do not depend on cultural or national values, but rather 
on evidence based medicine.165 Existing mechanisms, like professional 
guidelines and human rights, can provide a benchmark for proper 
medical standards and informed consent. They could easily be adapted 
to each medical procedure. For example, a public agency could require 
and enforce standards for each type of reproductive technology.166 
To confront socioeconomic disparity, a minimalistic approach could 
also regulate the price of each procedure and redistribute economic 
benefits more fairly. Each procedure might have a different price to 
award assisting women with a compensation reflecting the different 
physical risk factor in each process. Higher prices could fairly 
compensate women for greater risks and inconveniences.167 Differential 
pricing may change the potential profitability of the contract and 
represent society’s position regarding fair terms and its commitment to 
ensuring that the transaction benefits all.168 This justifies one regulative 
model, adapted to each technology.  
have to internalize the medical harms caused by an insufficient standard 
of medical care in destination countries. Regarding the self-interest of 
developed countries in the regulation of the medical services market, see 
Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global 
Justice,1 CAN. J. COMP & CONTEMP. L. 161, 186 (2015); Françoise Merlet, 
Regulatory Framework in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Relevance 
and Main Issues, 47 FOLIA HISTOCHEMICA ET CYTOBIOLOGICA S9, S12 
(2009) (relating to different levels of safety that jeopardizes both 
consumers’ countries and assisting women). 
165. For possible models that could promise safety and basic rights as well as 
ensure fair terms, see Bassan, Shared Responsibility, supra note139; 
Bassan, Fair Trade supra note 109. 
166. E.g., for human rights as the minimal threshold, see THOMAS POGGE, 
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2nd ed., 2008). It remains 
unclear whether the human rights common ground could meaningfully 
extend the principles of reproductive justice above a minimal human 
rights threshold. 
167. Wertheimer, supra note 66, at 55 (arguing that harsh terms may be 
compensated by relatively generous price). 
168. A measurement of “a fair” price is difficult. For possible calculations, see 
The Ethics Committee, supra note 96, at S243 (2004); Holland, supra note 
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As discussed above, in section II (c), the problem of transactions 
involving reproductive services is wider than that of poor medical or 
ethical standards, and is embedded in a structurally unjust system. 
Although a higher compensation might be a fair distribution under a 
minimalistic regulative model, increased payment in itself does not 
constitute recognition.169 A woman deserves payment for fulfilling the 
contract. The contract determines what is owed to her, but not the 
recognition she deserves, which is connected to what people deserve 
prior to entering the contract. Thus, a minimalist approach might not 
address this aspect. This supports the claim that fair redistribution and 
establishing recognition for assisting women should be interconnected.170 
Addressing the wider recognition aspect requires a structural, rather 
than a minimalistic approach. 
b. Pro-active model - Recognition 
A pro-active regulation model could revalue groups with diminished 
recognition and foster desirable market relations that are sensitive to 
social needs.171 What does recognition mean for women in each practice? 
Evidence shows that egg providers and surrogates each value the service 
they perform and have certain expectations due to their contribution. 
Kalfoglou and Geller show that egg providers “expect to have more 
control over the donation process and distribution of their oocytes.”172 
Women want to know what happens with the eggs that they provide—
whether an embryo was created, frozen, discarded, used for research, 
donated to additional women—and are concerned that the parents will 
not meet her specifications for acceptable recipients.173 Their follow-up 
study with egg providers in the U.S. reveals that egg providers expect 
a certain level of control over the decision of who are the parents who 
will raise the child born from their egg: 
 
8, at 269; see Karen H. Rothenberg, Feminism, Law, and Bioethics, 6 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 69, 75 (1996); Rosemarie Tong, Towards a 
Feminist Perceptive on Gamete Donation and Reception Policies, in NEW 
WAYS OF MAKING BABIES : THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 138, 142 (Cynthia 
B. Cohen ed., 1996); Widdows, supra note 41, at 18 (considering payment 
according to the earning of consumers). 
169. See John. A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical 
Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. 1, 31 (1989). 
170. Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice 
in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age, NEW LEFT REV. 68, 82 (1995). 
171. For recognition and respect for rights as legitimizing an aim, see Tobin, 
supra note 19, at 325. 
172. Kalfoglou & Geller, supra note 123, at 665. 
173. Id. at 665. 
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I want to know where it’s going. I’m not just haphazardly giving 
out eggs because that child is going to walk around with my eyes, 
my nose, my hair, and I want them to be treated well and raised 
with respect and at least in the manner in which I could have 
provided. 174 
They also want to know how many genetically-related children were 
born from their eggs, to protect their children from having sexual 
relations with half siblings, or protect themselves in case the children 
try to contact them later in life.175 Egg providers mention feeling left 
out when they received no information or that they “felt like a failure” 
when not contacted again.176 
While the procedures themselves and the role that women play in 
them are different, the surrogate may also feel that she is entitled to 
make claims on the baby. The effort she has put in gestation and giving 
birth makes her deserve a certain amount of recognition.177 For example, 
surrogates in India told researchers about their experience: 
They [doctors] only talk to the family [commissioning parents], as 
if it is them and not us who are pregnant.178 
After the delivery both the children had been admitted since it 
was a premature birth they were under supervision. I heard she 
(commissioning mother) sat with them all day but she didn’t 
come to see me even once. I was told the next day to leave. She 
came to meet me before I left. I asked her why are you sending 
me away so soon? She said it’s better if you leave now. This time 
we will not repeat our mistakes. We will not sign on a wrong 
agreement. And we will ask to see the child. We will tell 
them to call after taking the child. But no one is ready to 
do that, they are very much concerned that the child should not 
get to know.179 
As these examples show, surrogates often feel under-valued or 
disposable and wish that their role in the surrogacy procedure would be 
acknowledged. Resulting children may also feel dissatisfied with this 
 
174. Id. at 662. 
175. Kalfoglou 2000, supra note 67, at 663. 
176. Id. at 663-664. 
177. Amrita Pande, “It May Be Her Eggs But It’s My Blood”: Surrogates and 
Everyday Forms of Kinship in India, 32 Qualitative Soc. 379, 392 
(2009)(emphasis added) [hereinafter Pande, My Blood]. 
178. SAMA, supra note 75, at 76. 
179. Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added). 
Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018 
Different but Same: A Call for a Joint Pro-Active Regulation of Cross-
Border Egg and Surrogacy Markets 
359 
disconnection.180 Different blogs describe feelings of rejection by 
assisting women. The children also mention feeling a loss of identity 
and discuss how important it is for them to know the assisting women, 
despite their rearing parents’ feelings.181 
A moderate form of recognition could acknowledge certain legal 
rights of assisting women, grant them legal entitlements for more 
extensive information about the resulting children and further control 
within the transaction. Egg recruitment and pregnancy-carrying to 
term involve different efforts and connectedness. Recognizing women’s 
role and entitlements could reflect this difference. Both kinds of 
assisting women could, for example, choose the profile of intended 
parents, with the possibility of refusing consent or withdrawing from a 
certain profile. Egg sellers could also specify how many people would 
receive their eggs and what would happen to the fertilized eggs if the 
recipient no longer needed them for reproductive purposes. Both kinds 
of assisting women could receive general information regarding the 
child’s well-being, if they so wished.182 The different rights of resulting 
children should be relative to those of the assisting women. Because 
children should have a right to obtain information about their origin, 
assisting women may be required to disclose—albeit anonymously—
certain information in the future. For example, egg providers may have 
a duty to provide genetic information when genetic origin has medical 
implication. Duties and entitlements of assisting women should relate 
to their distinctive contribution and should not be equivalent to those 
of the intended parents, who will be the child’s raising parents and as 
such should receive the traditional rights and obligations associated 
with that role. The parents committed to rearing the child—the 
intended parents—should be the only ones required to support the child 
and take care of him or her. 
John A. Robertson mentions a stronger need for recognition that 
the egg providers have—to participate in the child-rearing process.183 
 
180. Ken R. Daniels, To Give or Sell Human Gametes – The Interplay Between 
Pragmatics, Policy and Ethics, 26 J. MED. ETHICS, 206, 210 (2000). 
181. For surrogacy, see I am a Product of Surrogacy, http://theothersid
eofsurrogacy.blogspot.co.il/; Pande, My Blood, supra note 177, at 383 
(interpreting the claims of surrogates according to which this 
blood/substance tie imparted identity to the child). For eggs, see Michael 
Cook, The pain of anonymous parentage - A new US forum gives voice 
to the grown children of anonymous donors, MERCATORNET (Jan. 27, 
2011), http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_pain_of_anon
ymous_parentage/. 
182. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 3636, at 56 (reporting that all surrogates 
wanted to have information about the child’s growth and whereabouts); 
183. Robertson, supra note 169, at 17. 
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Although some evidence for this interest exists in egg donation,184 
stronger evidence exists in surrogacy studies. Interviews with surrogates 
show that surrogates expect a long-term relationship to compensate for 
the gift they are giving.The relationship expected is similar to  185 
friendship or family ties, which they rarely receive. The market’s 
current operation does not satisfy these interests.186 State power plays 
a crucial role in excluding egg providers and surrogates from the 
intended family when it determines which relationships to recognize. 
Generally, where regulated, the different biological or genetic connections 
gamete sellers’ and surrogates’ have to the child are both unrecognized in 
the legal system.187 
A more extreme form of regulation could therefore consider a 
familial structure enabling interested families to involve assisting 
women in the child’s life in some way. Regulation could extend visiting 
rights or allow non-anonymous egg provision.188 Many intended parents  
184. See Kalfoglou & Geller, supra note 123, at 664. 
185. For the hopes of surrogates, see, for example, Pande, My Blood, supra 
note 177, at 388 (reporting that the surrogate Parvati hopes for a future 
connection with the intended parents and relates to them in a family-like 
way); NUPHAR LIPKIN & ETTI SAMAMA, SURROGACY IN ISRAEL - STATUS 
REPORT 2010 AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT 15 (2010), 
available at: http://isha.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/surrogacy
_Eng001.pdf (reporting that from the surrogate mother’s point of view, 
the human relationship and gratefulness that she experiences with the 
intended parents is a major source of her sense that the procedure is an 
act of heroism and not of exploitation); see Rabinowitz, supra note 48. 
186. Anderson, supra note 30, at 84; Pande, My Blood, supra note 177, at 380 
(highlighting how the surrogates’ constructions of everyday kinship 
disrupt theories of relatedness that are based solely on biology and 
procreation, and showing that by emphasizing connections based on 
shared bodily substance and by deemphasizing genetic ties, the surrogates 
challenge established hierarchies in kin relationships—where genes and 
the male seed triumph above all). 
187. For surrogacy, see Anderson, supra note 30, at 83 (“the surrogate industry 
has an interest in suppressing, manipulating, and trivializing her 
perspective, for there is an ever-present danger that she will see her 
involvement in her pregnancy from the perspective of a parent rather than 
from the perspective of a contract laborer.”); Scott, supra note 33, at 139-
42 (showing that the move to gestational surrogacy has facilitated the 
change in the social meaning of surrogacy from a mother’s sale of her baby 
to a transaction involving “carriers,” rather than “mothers, providing 
gestational services). For the development of anonymous gamete donation 
in order to avoid the wish of providers to know the recipient, see, e.g., 
Ertman, supra note 8, at 19 (regarding the social safeguard of anonymity 
of the sperm donor (protected by contract law) to protect the integrity of 
the new family that the recipient intends to create, which may imply that 
continuous relationship may harm such integrity). 
188. See Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case For Non-
Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J. L. & HEALTH 1, 20 (2007). 
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may see such an arrangement as a deal breaker. From a market point 
of view, viewing gametes and surrogacy services as market commodities 
implies that assisting women provide a product, raw material, or a 
service to interested consumers. The payment is seen as completion of 
the transaction, after which the relationship with the assisting woman 
is not expected to continue, especially when parties are from two 
different countries.189 But, maintaining respectful and inclusive 
relations might be a social interest, or value, that endures beyond a 
single transaction. Moreover, because of a child’s independent claim and 
possible interest in knowing her origins, recognizing assisting women is 
part of the obligations that intended parents owe their children.190 With 
many new types of families, this could be a realistic option if the 
contract clarifies these matters. 
If this is what recognition means, then maybe policy-makers should 
abolish the market unless recognition of assisting women is integrated 
into it. If social relations matter, a market that recognizes assisting 
women should be allowed, and one that is not should be prohibited. 
Despite differences in how recognition would apply to each practice, the 
regulative model of both markets should establish a platform that 
includes, empowers, and recognizes all participants, including assisting 
women. The choice to use the aid of an assisting woman, or to provide 
such aid through the cross-border market in human reproductive 
assistance generates a certain path for both parties. Choosing this path 
may impose upon participants a duty to recognize and respect each 
other. The need to respect your fellows, to recognize those who assist 
you through the market as human beings, should not only be a response 
to market failures. Rather, the demand that all persons in society be 
respected, as such, should be the foundation on which we establish the 
 
189. For egg donation, Daniels, supra note 181, at 210. For surrogacy, see ELLY 
TEMAN. BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE PREGNANT 
SELF 26 (2010) (“the exchange of money for a set of services leaves the 
buyer and the seller with no mutual obligation because the exchange 
expresses a relationship of otherness, a lack of relationship”); Pande 2009, 
supra note 28, at 164 (“[T]he rules of commercial surrogacy meant that 
the termination of that relationship was rather abrupt. Dr Khanderia 
ensured that the baby was taken away right after delivery so that the 
surrogate had no opportunity to change her mind.”). Saravanan, supra 
note 10, at 9 (reporting that most parents did not want to keep any 
contact with the surrogates after the process; some surrogates did not 
receive any call, and one surrogate was even given wrong contact details 
by the consumers); Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 53, at 498 
(reporting that in 11 out of 13 cases there was no family relationship 
between the intended parents and the surrogate mother). 
190. For the right to know one’s parentage as part of self-identity, see, e.g. 
Tobin, supra note 19, at 329-30. 
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mechanism of the market.191 Alternatively, the desire to remain 
connected may vary among assisting women, and some women may 
prefer to stay anonymous and disconnected.192 The current practice 
disconnects by default all assisting women from the family of the 
resulting child, including those who long for recognition. This situation 
increases alienation and exclusion of those who expect otherwise. A 
regulatory model supporting the recognition of assisting women’s 
concerns should at least offer the possibility of a flexible transaction in 
both egg and surrogacy markets. 
V. Conclusion 
The negative implications of the cross-border reproductive market 
do not stem from one transaction, but from the way that the market 
structure strengthens preexisting vulnerabilities, and reaffirms the 
hierarchical relationships. Social contexts that constitute a gendered 
socioeconomic class continue to keep some classes in a disempowered 
position. In the current cross-border framework, various health rights 
and basic freedoms of assisting women are infringed or violated, 
decreasing their recognition in society. The occurrence of medical risks, 
emotional burden, stigma, and biological and genetic connections to the 
resulting child may be different, but the implications are similar in both 
markets. Each market suffers from low medical standards, questionable 
process of informed consent, decreased protection of human rights, and 
a disparity in contractual benefits. In both egg and surrogacy markets, 
these considerations affect the way that assisting women perceive 
themselves and how they are perceived by society. 
The fact that cross-border surrogacy creates stronger pressure for 
international regulation than egg markets is taken to imply that these 
technologies call for distinct sets of regulations. This inference is 
mistaken. The distinction between regulation of cross-border egg and 
surrogacy markets diverts the focus from assisting women to intended 
parents and children. It leads to a minimal regulation of safety and 
medical technical conditions rather than a comprehensive regulation 
addressing the recognition of all involved. 
Despite obvious differences between providing egg and uterus 
services, a wider common ground exists between the two markets that 
policy-makers could address through one regulative approach. A pro-
 
191. See C. Shearing, A Constitutive Conception of Regulation, in BUSINESS 
REGULATION AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE 67, 69 (P. Grabosky and J. 
Braithwaite eds., 1994). 
192. Tong, supra note 168, at 147-148. E.g. Elena’s interview in Nahman, 2008, 
supra note104, at 72 (denying any kinship relationship with her egg, or 
the resulting child, saying he is not her own (although referring to it as 
‘my baby’). She therefore did not want any information about him.). 
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active model of regulation could contribute to social recognition, 
empowerment and respect, as well as minimal human rights and safety 
conditions. Disregarding these similarities may deprive assisting women 
from receiving the recognition they deserve. 
 
